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Over the last 25 years the southern maritime border of the European Union witnessed the 
interaction of considerable and increasingly complex irregular migration flows in the 
Mediterranean with the progressive construction and implementation of restrictive 
migration control policies by the European Union and its member states at their external 
borders. The article describes the evolving migration patterns and changes in migration 
routes both as a stimulus and as consequence of locally stepping up migration control at the 
emerging hotspots at different parts of the border, creating deviation effects in migration 
routes with alternative points of entry and higher costs and risks for migrants. Special 
attention is given to the impact of the 2015 refugee crisis on border management and the 
new challenges it poses to the asylum system and the protection of fundamental rights. 
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Containing irregular immigration has become a priority on the 
European political agenda over the past two decades. The signing of the 
Schengen Agreement at the start of the 1990s initiated the gradual creation 
of a common border policy, which has advanced a great deal over the last 
few years through institutional and instrumental development, combining 
national actions with supranational and multilateral initiatives that have 
resulted in what is known as Integrated Border Management (IBM). These 
initiatives have mostly focused on actions taken at what is referred to as the 
"external southern blue borders" in the European Union.  
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The southern maritime border of the Schengen Area has a longitude of 
just over 35,000 kilometers, extending from the Portuguese coast to the Greek 
islands near the coast of Turkey. Spain, Italy, Greece and Malta have become 
the main destinations for irregular migration flows arriving by sea to Europe, 
mostly due to their geographical proximity to countries in the Southern 
Mediterranean Riviera and Turkey. The main European routes for irregular 
immigration through the Atlantic and Mediterranean (which includes the 
Alboran, Ionic and Aegean seas) are primarily directed towards these four 
countries, more specifically, the Western Atlantic route, the Western 
Mediterranean route, the Central Mediterranean route and the Eastern 
Mediterranean route1
The dynamics of maritime migration have been conditioned by 
changing geopolitical contexts, especially in African or Middle-Eastern 
countries, and by the migration control actions that have been implemented 
at different parts of the border around Europe’s perimeter. The 
development of these control actions during the construction of a common 
policy has been influenced by the diverging interests of the European 
countries whose geographical positions lead to much different reception 
frequencies. Because the creation of this common border policy is a delicate 
process involving asymmetrical state and supranational interests and 
actions, it has generated serious political tensions among member states 
during the different migration crises. To complicate things further, the 
external areas surrounding the European Union function as a buffer 
system, in which increasing control of migration flows in one area produce 
changes, or “deviation effects”, in others, a situation that has been likened 
to playing a game of whack-a-mole. Despite these issues, common 
migration control policies have been applied over the past decade, 
. These are routes that have experienced fluctuations 
inflows over the last 25 years and have been subjected to selective 
(im)permeability practices for unauthorized migration heading to Europe. 
For more than a decade these routes have sparked the interest of public 
opinion and political authorities due to their volumes, the danger involved 
in using them and because they have served as “test benches” to develop 
European policies on maritime migration control, concentrating a large 
number of initiatives and European and national resources.  
                                                          
1 See http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/ and I-Map 
(http://www.imap-migration.org/ 
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characterized by a series of interrelated dynamic traits developed 
sequentially and in an increasingly coordinated fashion: externalization 
(including bilateralism), communitarization, “remote control”, techno-
logization and privatization. 
The objective of this article is to analyze the dynamics and discrepancies 
involved with applying this policy on the southern maritime border of the 
European Union since the creation of the Schengen Area. This focus 
highlights aspects related to the maritime nature of these borders, 
combining these physical and geographic conditions with the idiosyncrasy 
of a political action that in an uncertain geopolitical setting has had to 
simultaneously deal with: a) different levels of migration frequency; b) 
diverse national, binational and supranational interests; and c) numerous 
responses against such action by civil society and the international 
community. It is, therefore, an analysis that characterizes the political 
sphere of border control as a multilayered, multi-staged, multi-located and 
contested action.  
The article is divided into four parts. The first part describes the evolving 
traits of this intervention, based on the perception that migration control at the 
border is a “selective permeability” mechanism used to block unwanted 
human movement within a highly complex European border system. The 
second part analyzes the migration dynamics of the main maritime routes, 
with special attention paid to the cases of Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece. The 
third part examines the changes that the maritime border has undergone since 
the end of 2013, with the intensification of the Central Mediterranean route 
and later the refugee crisis through the maritime route to Greece. The fourth 
part analyzes how adapting the European migration control system, including 
border control, freedom of movement and asylum instruments, to these new 
dynamics has produced serious political tensions, once again focusing on the 
discrepancies that have emerged between national and supranational interests.  
 
 
2. Controlling irregular maritime immigration in Southern Europe: geopolitical 
determinants of constructing a single border 
 
2.1 The gradual construction of a common border 
The economic integration of the European Union, and to a lesser degree 
its political and social integration, has advanced substantially over the past 
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few decades, creating a single market that allows the free movement of 
capital, goods and people among the member states. The creation of an area 
of free movement made necessary the construction of a shared external 
border with similar permeability at all points, including the manner in 
which the entry of irregular immigrants is controlled. This process involves 
continuous agreements on many issues, such as the regulation of visas, the 
determination of requirements to allow passage through the territory or the 
creation of joint systems to register passengers and migrants.  
The construction of a common external border has encountered many 
obstacles due to the reticence of member states to cede part of their national 
sovereignty to supranational institutions. These misgivings have limited 
the progress in this area to small concessions during border crises that 
obligate member states to accept greater collaboration.  
In the case of migration management, nation states retain direct control 
of their borders, with some voluntary collaboration through Frontex (the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency), and integrated information 
systems like EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System). Moreover, 
the freedom of movement across internal borders guaranteed by the 
Schengen Agreement can be temporarily suspended given extraordinary 
circumstances, as occurred in 2015 along the routes used by Syrian and 
Afghan refugees.  
The way irregular immigration is controlled illustrates the reactive 
nature of the “bordering” process, which leads to what some authors refer 
to as “borderscapes” (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2007; Brambilla, 2015), 
highlighting that it is a dynamic process undergoing constant reform. There 
is a vast economic gap at the southern border of the EU, separated and 
connected by the Mediterranean, the main interstitial space between 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East, which generates a great deal of 
migratory pressure. Not surprisingly, the management of international 
mobility in this part of the world has faced emerging challenges regarding 
the protection of migrants, the implementation of the rules to access the 
Schengen Area and international cooperation between EU member states 
and also with neighboring countries.  
The combination of policies, institutions and instruments that the 
European Union has adopted since the 1990s has the following features. 
First of all, the southern maritime border of the EU has gradually been 
made impermeable by focusing on "emergent" routes and hotspots where 
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irregular immigration routes attempt to penetrate European territory. This 
has resulted in control measures being deployed first in the western 
Mediterranean and later extending east. This gradual implementation 
includes a wide variety of actors and employs many instruments, making it 
a multi-located, multi-staged and multilayered intervention. Second, this 
gradual deployment has resulted in an integrated information and 
detection system named EUROSUR equipped with advanced technologies 
to detect the vessels used by immigrants, facilitate information exchange 
between states and accelerate the development of coordinated actions. 
EUROSUR is a key part of the final objective, which is to attain complete 
Integrated Border Management (Godenau, 2012: 8). Third, the European 
Commission has opted to outsource the creation and experimentation of 
the technologies used by EUROSUR, seeking the active involvement of 
prominent companies in the Defense and Security industries (Godenau and 
López-Sala, 2016a; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013; Baird, 2016). Fourth, the 
creation of Frontex has allowed the operational response capacity of the EU 
along its external borders to be expanded. Its mission is to promote, 
coordinate and develop European border management in line with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, applying the concept of 
Integrated Border Management. Frontex has gradually increased its scope 
and competences; for example, it now includes a Fundamental Rights 
Officer to help protect fundamental rights during the interception, 
retention and derivation of migrants, among other oversight mechanisms. 
Fifth, Integrated Border Management also covers one of the specific causes 
of forced migration: the search for refuge and asylum. In this area, the EU 
follows the principle that the first member state to take the fingerprints of a 
refugee or that receives a request for asylum is responsible for examining 
the request for international protection (Dublin III Regulation of 2013: 
Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013). As we shall see later, this principle 
generates asymmetries due to the fact that some countries are more 
exposed to external borders than others. The outermost countries have to 
deal with a greater number of asylum seekers, regardless of the desired 
final destination of the migrants, and the refugee crisis of 2015 has 
provoked an intense debate regarding the mechanisms used to distribute 
refugees among EU member states. Sixth, the increasing number of 
refugees reaching the EU external borders triggered the decision to use 
Turkey as an enforced destination of migrants, with the aim of reducing the 
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number of additional asylum seekers in EU countries. This type of remote 
control does not concentrate on controlling migrants’ exit or transit, it 
focuses on creating substitutive involuntary destinations. 
The complexity involved in creating and maintaining this common 
border explains why its approach to managing economic and forced 
migration is so different from other international borders to which it is 
frequently compared, such as the border between Mexico and the United 
States (Andreas 2001; Fernández-Kelly and Massey, 2007; Koslowski, 2011; 
Jaskoski, Sotomayor and Trinkunas, 2015). The fact that it is a maritime 
border, coupled with its complex political and institutional framework, 
makes it very distinct from other borders. 
 
2.2The dynamics of maritime migration flows (1990-2016) 
The transformation of southern European countries into migration 
destinations in the 1980s led to maritime flows of irregular immigrants just 
a few years later. Therefore, this is not a new phenomenon, although the 
volume it has reached today is larger than it has been in the past quarter 
century (Fargues and Di Bartolomeo 2015; UNHCR, 2015; Newland, Collet, 
Hooper and Flamm, 2016; Crawley, Duvell, Sigona, McMahon and Jones, 
2016). 
Despite the fact that for years the volume of these flows was modest 
compared to those entering through airport and land borders, this type of 
migration has been a priority on the agenda of Spain, Greece, Italy and 
Malta over the past few decades. Their geographic proximity with the 
southern Mediterranean Riviera and the Maghreb, the Balkans and Turkey 
have converted them into the first stage or final destination of mixed flows 
(economic and forced) since the beginning of the 1990s. The dynamics of 
these maritime routes to Southern Europe have been affected by economic 
and geopolitical factors, such as the control measures taken at different 
points of the perimeter. In fact, whenever control has been increased over 
one part of the area surrounding the perimeter through surveillance, 
detection and (physical and virtual) containment measures, it has activated 
new corridors or reactivated old routes. This has created a dynamic and 
interactive system that evolves and receives feedback from land and air 
routes and shapes the geographic priorities for actions and intervention.  
The fact that these irregular migration flows are travelling through a 
maritime environment makes an enormous difference in how they are 
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controlled compared to other settings2
At the end of the 1980s migrants also began flowing through the 
Western Mediterranean route across the Strait of Gibraltar to the Spanish 
coast. This flow was consolidated in the 1990s, giving rise to the first deaths 
along that route and provoking the first Spanish measures to control its 
maritime borders (López-Sala and Esteban, 2010; López-Sala, 2015). 
. First of all, because migrants must 
use some kind of vessel (which depending on the type of crossing varies 
greatly, from large ships to medium-sized boats to tiny pateras or even 
inflatable toy rafts used in the Strait of Gibraltar) they need some material 
resources at their disposable (or to be able to pay for them), a certain 
amount of organization, at least in the mid-sized vessels that require fuel, 
some type of navigation system and the ability to steer. The need for a 
vessel has generated a substantial market for middlemen in the coastal 
regions of countries from which these voyages are launched, a local 
migration industry that coexists with the remote surveillance carried out by 
receiving countries through collaboration with transit countries. The 
varying durations and risk involved in the different types of voyages also 
requires the migrants to undertake them with very different resources. 
Second, the amplitude of the maritime borders is an incentive to use the 
most sophisticated and expensive control and surveillance technologies 
that are capable of detecting vessels from a great distance and the most 
advanced remote sensing systems, most of which employ satellites and 
UAVs (Godenau and López-Sala, 2016a). This is why maritime routes 
require greater organization (and a “migration industry”) and the migrants 
need more resources than they do when taking land routes.  
In addition, series of high intensity immigration episodes are central to 
this evolution, what the press usually refers to as a “migrant crisis”. These 
episodes began at the start of the 1990s when the first maritime flows 
reached the coast of Apulia (Bari and Brindisi) in Italy, through the Adriatic 
and the Strait of Otranto. The fall of the government in Albania and the war 
in the former Yugoslavia triggered the first stream of Albanian and 
Kosovar refugees (Albahari, 2006). 
                                                          
2 Newland, Collet, Hooper and Flamm suggested that irregular maritime migration can 
be characterized as a “wicked problem” extremely difficult to address. In their opinion the 
complexity of the management of maritime migration is related to the increasing number of 
actors involved in the process, the overlapping legal rulings at the sea and the risk of the 
routes (Newland, Collet, Hooper and Flamm, 2016).  
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Something similar occurred in the central corridor of the Mediterranean 
where since the 1990s the flow to Italy has intensified. The stabilization of 
the Balkans caused this route to lose importance in the east-west direction, 
while at the same time the south-north flow from Africa to Southern Italy 
intensified, first to Calabria, Sicily and the Aegadian Islands and from 2002 
to the Pelagie Islands (Pastore, Monzini and Sciortino, 2006). Between the 
end of the 1990s and the start of the 2000s, the Western Mediterranean and 
Central Mediterranean routes became the most active maritime routes, and 
the origin of the migrants diversified, with the presence of Maghrebis 
(Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians) and Western Africans (especially 
from countries in the Gulf of Guinea), Central Africans and migrants from 
the Horn of Africa (López-Sala, 2015; Godenau, 2014; Cuttita, 2008). Since 
2002, Malta became one of the main destination countries. This was an 
“unexpected destination” (López-Sala and Esteban, 2010; Mainwaring, 
2014) through the Central Mediterranean route for a large number of 
refugees from Eritrea and Somalia who initiated their sea voyage in Libya 
and then connected with the Eastern African land route.   
Increased surveillance and control of the Western Mediterranean, 
especially with the gradual implementation of the Integrated External 
Surveillance System (SIVE) in the Strait of Gibraltar by Spain, caused the 
flows to be diverted west, activating new routes such as the Western Africa 
route connecting the coast of Africa with the Canary Archipelago. This 
route is where the “cayuco crisis” occurred in 2006. In just one year over 
30,000 migrants from various African countries arrived in this archipelago 
belonging to Spain, which at the time was the most intense migration 
episode observed at Europe’s Mediterranean perimeter (Godenau, 2012; 
Godenau, 2014; López-Sala, 2015; Godenau and López-Sala, 2016b). The 
cayuco crisis had an enormous impact on the later evolution of migration 
control along the entire European maritime perimeter. It provoked an 
escalation in national and, especially EU actions to increase the surveillance 
and detection of maritime migrants. This included the implementation of 
the first joint Frontex operations (Operation Hera), the beginning of 
collaboration agreements with transit countries and later, the emergence of 
EUROSUR (Godenau and López-Sala, 2016a, 2016b). While improved 
surveillance in the Western Mediterranean substantially decreased the flow 
through the Western Africa route, at the same time it caused the flows 
though the central sector of the Mediterranean to increase, with a large 
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spike in arrivals to the coasts of Malta in 2007 and 2008 (Lutterbeck, 2009; 
Lutterbeck and Mainwaring, 2015) and the Italian islands of Sicily and 
Lampedusa (Cuttita, 2008). This led Frontex to extend its joint operations to 
the Central Mediterranean (Operation Nautilus) and stimulated bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations with the main transit countries (Tunisia and 
Libya) throughout 2009. Greece has also been the destination of maritime 
flows to its Aegean islands since the 1990s, with a slight increase in volume 
in the past decade, especially in 2007, but had remained below the volumes 
seen in Spain and Italy until the recent refugee crisis of 2015, which has 
surpassed previous migration records to Europe since the middle of the 
20th Century. 
The penultimate migrant crisis in the Mediterranean occurred in 2011 
and was the result of the Arab Spring, which caused many young people to 
flee to Europe from Maghreb countries, especially Tunisia, but also Egypt. 
An earlier flow of Tunisian youths to Italy had been seen in 2008, when the 
Tunisian regime repressed the “Redeyef”, a social movement that had 
arisen in mining areas in the southern part of the country, where the youth 
unemployment rate was over 60%. The 2011 crisis, however, led to a series 
of factors that have been consolidated since 2014. First of all, the perception 
that these migrant crises are emergencies, which was already present in the 
events of 2006, has been increasingly consolidated with each episode. It 
should be remembered that while the state of emergency involves 
humanitarian assistance, it also includes actions directed at increasing 
security. During the 2011 crisis, which witnessed clashes between the 
Italian and French governments, for the first time real statutory proposals 
to suspend the Schengen Agreement appeared, an aspect of common policy 
that until that moment had been broadly supported by the member states. 
In addition, at that time, the “principle of solidarity” with border countries 
during periods of intense inflows seemed to have been broken after years 
of high tension, as was evident in 2014 during the preparation of Frontex’s 
Operation Triton, which substituted the Italian operation, Mare Nostrum. 
The intensification of the flow over the past year has been particularly 
revealing of the weakness of European policy compared to national or 
individual actions and also how European states react differently to these 
successive migration crises depending on their proximity to their 
territories. 
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3. Recent changes in the southern border of Europe: the “refugee crisis” and intra-
European transit migration 
 
Since the end of 2013 the situation at the southern border of the 
European Union has again undergone very significant changes. The current 
migration panorama in the Mediterranean has been caused by a cluster of 
political conflicts in areas under European influence, especially due to the 
instability in many Maghreb countries (Mali, Libya, Egypt), sub-Saharan 
Africa (Nigeria) and Western Africa (Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia), as well as 
the deadlocked wars in Syria and Afghanistan. The unprecedented growth 
of migration flows and deaths in transit (Brian and Laczko, 2014 and 2016)3 
through the central Mediterranean produced a broad diplomatic and 
political reaction at the European level, which included the creation of the 
Task Force Mediterranean, the deployment of the Mare Nostrum rescue 
operation by the Italian government and later the Frontex operation, Triton. 
Throughout 2014, more than 170,000 people were intercepted along this 
route to Italy, in vessels mainly from Libya, but also from the coasts of 
Egypt and Turkey. The intensification of these flows was combined with 
the diversification of origins, with a growing presence of Syrians4
The failure to reach a diplomatic agreement with a politically unstable 
Libya, which had become the principal hub of this route, led the European 
Union to adopt extraordinary measures, including launching military 
operations such as EUNAVFOR in June 2015 to fight against migrant 
 and 
Eritreans (Fargues and Di Bartolomeo, 2015). During that year the political 
debate in Europe focused on creating measures that were capable of 
containing arrivals, while also protecting the lives of the migrants, although 
the resulting political agreements seem somewhat ambivalent to such a 
balance. Although European authorities have mentioned that search and 
rescue is a priority, rescue operations, such as Mare Nostrum, have also 
been perceived as a factor that attracts flows to this route (Fargues and 
Bonfati, 2014; Newland, Collet, Hooper and Flamm, 2016). 
                                                          
3 See http://missingmigrants.iom.int.  
4 The intensification of arrivals of Syrians to European countries was also observed in 
Spain, although to a much smaller degree. Since 2014 Spanish territory has been accessed 
through what is known as the peripheral land border (mainly the city of Melilla), as 
indicated by the reports of different social organizations (CEAR, 2016; JRS, 2014; APDHA, 
2015). 
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smuggling networks operating in this corridor (Arteaga and González, 
2015). The Malta Declaration in February 2017 included as a priority aim 
the stabilization of Libya as a part of a strategy to reduce the flows along 
the Central Mediterranean route5
In 2015 the other route widely used by Syrian and Afghan refugees was 
the Western Balkan route, an intra-European route (that does not only 
include EU or Schengen Area countries) from Greece to Central Europe. 
Transit through this corridor, which caught the attention of the European 
and International media in the middle of 2015, includes itineraries through 
Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary and Austria
.   
Throughout 2015 and 2016 the routes used by migrants and refugees, 
mainly from Afghanistan and Syria, diversified. Firstly, there was a sharp 
increase in the volume of the flow through the Eastern Mediterranean 
route, both through the land border of Greece with Turkey and the Aegean 
sea, to the islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos. In 2015 and 2016 Italy and 
Greece received the most immigrants and refugees in the European Union, 
far ahead of Spain and Malta, with low numbers in comparative terms. 
After the European agreement with Turkey in March 2016, the number of 
irregular migrants reported from the Central Mediterranean route was 
again higher than on any other route (FRONTEX, 2017).  
6
There are various reasons why media and political attention has been so 
intensely focused on this transit movement toward central and northern 
European countries. First of all, the novelty of an intra-European migration 
route, coupled with the various external and internal controls that have 




                                                          
5 This declaration also included a new action plan to support the Libyan national coast 
guard and other agencies, the development of local communities, especially in coastal areas, 
and the support of assisted voluntary return programs. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu 
/press-releases-pdf /2017/2/47244654402_en.pdf. 
6 It also includes a much less used route that crosses the border between Turkey and 
Bulgaria.  
7 In the past years border walls (or reinforced fences) have been built at several perimeter 
areas of the European Union: a) the border between Turkey and Greece (Erdine), b) Turkey 
and Bulgaria (Lesovo and Kraynovo), c) Greece and Macedonia, d) Serbia and Hungary, e) 
France and the UK (Calais), f) Austria and Slovenia; g) Austria and Hungary, and h) 
Slovenia and Croatia. A new wall is now under construction on the Norway-Russian border.  
 and taking exceptional measures to close borders within the 
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Schengen Area8
Second, the difficulties in agreeing upon common border and asylum 
policies in the European Union, which has a great diversity of national 
border and asylum policies. In this sense, it should be mentioned that there 
have been repeated accusations made by other member states that Greece 
and Italy had not been meeting their obligations to effectively control its 
borders and had been showing “little interest” in registering potential 
refugees that cross through their territory. The euphemistic expression 
“hotspots approach”
. This intra-European transit involves the borders of EU 
countries, as well as those of neighboring countries that are not (yet) part of 
the common border. The reactions of eastern and southeastern European 
countries to this pressure on their borders has been particularly harsh, as 
could be observed in Hungary’s response in the summer of 2015, both in 
terms of border management and in their refusal to receive refugees.  
9
Fourth, the substantial growth of immigration flows through the Eastern 
Mediterranean route took place at a time when there was a special alert due to 
terrorist attacks on European soil and the fact that the immigration was 
coming from regions in related conflicts (e.g., Syria). The receiving societies 
 (Prieto, 2016), which provided operational support to 
assist member states to manage “exceptional” migration flows was not the 
result of intra European solidarity but a new way to ensure the registration 
and identification of irregular migrants and asylum seekers at the external 
borders of Europe. 
Third, the immigration dynamics through these routes over the past 
three years have provoked a differentiated management of what are 
considered economic routes and those used by asylum seekers, which has 
garnered a great deal of criticism from civil associations and international 
organizations, who feel that some of the flows which are being treated as 
economic, should in fact be considered forced migration. 
                                                          
8 This element had already been introduced into European policy during the 
intensification of arrivals to Italy in 2011 and 2012 as a consequence of the Arab Spring. In 
fact, the temporary reestablishment of internal border controls was formalized in 2013 
through the approval of a regulation that specifically allows suspending Schengen for 
security reasons. The temporary suspension of Schengen involves reactivating internal 
borders and controlling the movement of people as if they were conventional international 
borders. During 2015 internal controls were reestablished in the Schengen Area countries of 
Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Austria, Germany and Sweden.   
9 The European Commission formulated the hotspot approach in the European Agenda 
on Migration in April 2015.  
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under terrorist threat perceive migrants and refugees not only as a population 
that needs assistance, but also as a source of insecurity. This climate of public 
opinion is a new version of “moral panic” that has been fueled in Europe in 
large part by right-wing political authorities and extremist groups who have 
gained visibility and support in the past two years.  
Finally, Turkey’s role as a transit country gained protagonism in this 
new scenario. In 2016 the European Union promoted a series of agreements 
with Turkey to increase its cooperation in controlling the flow through its 
territory, agreements that not only included generous economic 
endowments, but also relaxed the visa policy for Turkish nationals and 
reconsidered Turkey’s adhesion to the European Union10
It is important to underscore that creating an area of free movement for 
people in Europe through the Schengen Agreement required harmonizing 
European asylum policies. This was accomplished through the signing of 
the Dublin Convention in 1990, which was later modified in 2003 and 2013 
through what are referred to as the Dublin II and Dublin III regulations. 
The main objective of this agreement was to determine which European 
country within the Schengen Area would be responsible for processing 
each asylum request to avoid what was referred to in the 1980s as 




4.  The impact of the “refugee crisis” on the construction of a common border 
 
The “refugee crisis” turned the European agenda on its head and had a 
profound impact on the construction of the common border and the EU’s 
policies on the free movement of people and asylum (Morillas, Sánchez-
Montijano and Soler, 2015). Various factors mentioned earlier in this article 
have led to tensions across Europe. To begin with, for the first time a large 
percentage of the migrants using these routes are refugees. This means that 
these flows have to be managed differently than traditional flows of 
economic migrants, considering that refugees are forced into migration and 
require international protection. Therefore, the initiatives implemented 
through the Schengen Agreement must be combined with the conditions 
put in place by the Dublin Regulation.   
                                                          
10 EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-268_en.htm. 
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member states). In order of priority, the criteria to determine the country 
responsible for processing each application are: a) first of all, the country 
where the applicant has family members with refugee status11
This agreement has been heavily criticized, especially during the 2015 
crisis. First of all, it did not guarantee a fair distribution of asylum seekers, 
because the responsibility falls mainly on the perimeter border states. In 
addition, it is common for recent refugees not to apply for asylum in the 
countries through which they enter European territory, but rather in those 
states that have better resources for receiving them. The difficulties in 
applying this agreement are tied, therefore, to the unequal distribution of 
responsibilities, the diversity of asylum policies among European countries 
and the difficulties in effectively determining which state is responsible to 
process asylum applications
; b) second, 
the European state in which the applicant has a residence permit or visa; c) 
the country through which the applicant entered the territory of the 
European Union. The establishment of this procedure has had two 
important consequences for the concession or denial of refugee status. First 
of all, that the concession or denial is definite, that is, once the application 
has been processed and resolved, the asylum seeker cannot apply again in 
another European country. Second, applicants cannot freely and 
unilaterally choose where to apply for refugee status wherever they like, 
but rather they must adhere to the conditions established by the Dublin 
regulation. 
12
The disparities caused by the Dublin Regulation and the need to find a 
solution for the thousands of refugees who entered Europe over the past two 
years had much to do with the political agreement that German Chancellor, 
Angela Merkel, and the European Commission negotiated to ensure that the 
refugees were distributed among the different countries, which was finally 
signed in September 2015. This binding agreement
.  
13
                                                          
11 These criteria are considered a priority to protect the fundamental right of family 
reunification. 
12 Another important criticism is that the agreement violates the rights of refugees, since 
the fair and efficient examination of the applications is not guaranteed in every country 
(Garcés-Mascarenas, 2015, 2016).  
13 This is a binding agreement that must also be respected by countries who voted 
against it, such as Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
 involved the 
distribution and relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers coming from Italy and 
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Greece, the main entrance countries14
Although the recent flows of irregular immigration through the 
southern border of the EU contain a high percentage of refugees fleeing the 
war in Syria, it should be remembered that it is not the source of all 
migration and that the Syrian conflict is not the only one that is provoking 
forced migrations
. This revealed that the tensions caused 
by “the refugee crisis” affecting the Schengen Agreement, the main 
instrument ensuring free movement in Europe, have also affected the Dublin 
Convention, the main political mechanism for a common asylum policy.  
The political implications also included new mobility dynamics. The 
discrepancy between where the flows of refugees have arrived during this 
crisis (mainly Greece and Italy) and where asylum applications were made 
(mostly Germany, but also in the Scandinavian countries) have been caused 
by an intra-European transmigration process that had not been seen since 
the Schengen and Dublin agreements were adopted and that has reinforced 
the idea the main European instruments for asylum and free movement 
must be reformed or replaced. 
15
The emergence of migration in the Eastern Mediterranean through the 
routes crossing the Balkans and in the Central Mediterranean also 
provoked various interrelated phenomena. First, the solidarity shown by 
border populations and volunteer organizations, who are doing a great 
deal of the work to assist and rescue migrants, mainly during the 
dangerous maritime crossings where they put their lives at risk. It is worth 
mentioning, due to its novelty, that some non-state actors and private 
organizations are taking part in rescue operations, especially during the 
. Furthermore, it is important to note that the speed at 
which the routes have changed and reorganized over the past two years 
reveals just how volatile the dynamics of migration flows to Europe are at 
present.  
                                                          
14 By the end of 2016 European countries relocated only one in twenty of the refugees 
they promised to shelter under this agreement. In March 2017 over 13,000 asylum seekers 
have now been relocated from Greece and Italy to other European Union member states 
(European Commission, 2017). 
15 According to the latest data published by FRONTEX the majority of the asylum 
seekers come from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Other important nationalities of the asylum 
seekers are Nigeria, Pakistan, Iran and Eritrea (FRONTEX, 2017).  
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last months at the Central Mediterranean route16
The "refugee crisis" is both a reflection and cause of the difficulties faced 
by the European project to achieve economic, political and social 
integration. The debate provoked by the distribution of responsibilities 
reveals that national sovereignty has far from disappeared and the 
community project is in danger of being partially dismantled. The 
. Second, the volume of 
this flow over the last years has been so large that in February of 2016 the 
intervention of NATO military forces was approved for reconnaissance, 
control and supervision operations, with the goal of fighting against 
migrant smuggling networks in the Aegean. The intervention of Frontex, 
the European agency created to manage such emergencies, has clearly been 
insufficient. In this sense, the public mechanisms and resources that have 
been assigned to manage migration have been incapable of meeting the 
challenge of a flow of this magnitude. Third, the actions and attitudes of 
European countries have not exactly been respectful towards fundamental 
rights. Actions that have been criticized include the repressive use of the 
army in Hungary or the seizure of the financial resources of refugees in 
Denmark. Fourth, the migration crisis has reinforced the involvement of 
civil organizations in keeping watch over events affecting migrants, 
reporting the violation of their rights and the actions taken to correct these 
situations. In this sense, what has been called “humanitarian border” by 
Walters (2011) is reflected in the active involvement of civil society in 
holding the states accountable for their actions. Finally, the European 
Union will probably further externalize migration management to Turkey 
and other transit countries in exchange for economic and political 
concessions. It remains to be seen if in that transfer of competences the new 
actors will also be held accountable. 
 
 
5. Final thoughts 
 
                                                          
16 One example is the Spanish NGO Open Arms Proactiva which has been carrying out 
maritime rescue operations since September 2015 near the Greek islands of Lesbos and 
Chios (http://www.proactivaopenarms.org/) and since September 2016 at the Central 
Mediterranean corridor, or the MOAS association, which is carrying out rescue operations 
since the end of 2013 in the Central Mediterranean and in the Aegean with private boats and 
vessels (https://www.moas.eu) (see also Cusumano, 2017). 
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European Union is suffering yet again from the consequences of an 
integration policy that mainly advances reactively and is always 
conditioned by negotiations of national sovereignty. Although the 
European migration panorama is at a crossroads, and how it is managed 
politically will be determined by the results of multilateral negotiations, it 
is urgent that public and media thoughts on this issue be accompanied by 
an academic reflection. This should be based on the challenges that this 
new scenario presents in terms of European values and internal social 
cohesion, the impacts on the economy and the welfare state, as well as the 
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